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ABSTRACT
There is an increasing proliferation of small satellite based solutions for diverse applications. There is an expectation
to deliver mission success to match the steady upward trajectory of system performance. The present challenge facing
the developer community is how to provide a balanced design approach that meets both the operational needs and
practical imperatives of a small satellite solution, which can scale to constellation-level numbers, within
commensurate programmatic constraints. Though functionally distinct, the drivers for government programs seeking
complementary solutions to more traditional exquisite system acquisitions and “New Space” players desiring rapid
ways to dependably build-out their space layer, all motivate the need to consider a hybrid approach to produce the
desired end state: “Smart Space.” This approach represents a strategy that includes consideration of determining
appropriate mission assurance standards, design standards, part sourcing strategy, expansion of the supply-chain,
performing qualification and acceptance testing, reporting on anomalies and implementing corrective and preventive
actions. SSL has a flexible, highly tailorable approach to project execution and mission assurance. This approach
draws upon observable metrics for satellite fabrication, assembly, integration, and test, along with empirically
measured flight performance of GEO and LEO satellites. In this paper we discuss the methods that SSL is employing
for its “Smart Space” approach, across satellite production activities for both government and commercial customers,
as well as recommendations for how the community should continue to evolve their methods for production
engineering and verification.
and subsystems for government and commercial
satellites following this same methodology.

ABOUT SSL
SSL (a Maxar Technologies Company) is a global leader
in delivering advanced systems for communications,
exploration, data gathering and next-generation services.
Based in the U.S., the company designs and
manufactures innovative spacecraft and space-related
systems with an advanced product line that includes
high-power geostationary satellites, state-of-the-art
small satellites and sophisticated robotics and
automation solutions for remote operations.

Less well known is that SSL also provides smaller
spacecraft systems in primarily non-geosynchronous
orbits. SSL non-GEO experience includes more than one
hundred satellites ranging from the initial
communications experiments and sub-synchronous
constellations, the first Globalstar constellation, the
Planet / Skysat Earth Observation Satellite constellation,
built under contract, and under development, various
multi-spacecraft constellations such as World View
Legion for Digital Globe, and single-spacecraft
demonstration vehicles. SSL product lines are described
in Figure 1 and a small satellite example is shown in Fig.
2.

SSL is best known as a provider of large geostationary
communications spacecraft (GEO-Comm) for services
such as direct-to-home television, video content
distribution, broadband internet, and mobile
communications. As of the end of 2017, SSL has built
139 three axis GEO-Comm satellites and has the largest
fleet currently in service. These satellites are built to the
highest quality and reliability standards and use robust
systems engineering; qualification testing; space grade
(grade 1) parts; full redundancy and other techniques to
ensure mission success. SSL is currently implementing
several highly sophisticated in-orbit servicing spacecraft

Product
SSL-1300
SSL-500
SSL-100

Power
5-20+ KW
Up to 1.6 kW
Up to 400 W

Dry Mass
1300-4200 Kg
500-700 Kg
Up to 250 Kg

Life
15 years
Up to 10 years
Up to 5 years

Figure 1: SSL Product Lines
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Modern design and manufacturing methods are
emphasized in a “Smart Space” approach used for the
smaller satellites. This allows us to service a wide range
of payloads for customers with a wide range of risk
tolerance.

initiatives and practices are discussed in subsequent
sections.

MISSION RISK TAILORING
The traditional risk management approach developed for
SSL’s Flagship 1300 Class Programs is based on a
rigorous design, manufacturing, and validation process
in which all levels of risk are identified and mitigated as
part of a comprehensive risk mitigation strategy.
Focused on reducing risks to the maximum extent
possible at each lifecycle state for every SSL built
satellite, this approach has proven effective, and ensures
the very high level of reliability that our customers have
come to expect.
Using this knowledge SSL has been able to tailor our
mission assurance activities to meet the specific mission,
system, or program requirements without increasing risk
in an unacceptable way.
Each pursuit is evaluated against a prototypical mission
risk class based on mission requirements, risk tolerance
of the mission and the customer’s business goals. The
tailoring of mission assurance activities is patterned after
the Mission Assurance Improvement Workshop (Ref. 1).

Figure 2: SSL Small Satellite Example
WHAT IS “SMART SPACE?”

MISSION RISK CLASS PROFILES

Smart Space is an effort to move beyond what has
become routine in the traditional GEO-Comm space
model. Our Smart Space effort has focused on
reexamination of the applicability and effectiveness of
heritage practices to develop a clean, but adaptable,
baseline of processes with which to move forward. Our
objective is to have a balanced design approach that
meets both the operational needs and the practical
imperatives of a small satellite solution that can scale,
when needed, to the constellation level. Retention of the
most effective practices is desirable, even in a
constrained project, while optimizations can be
implemented for better efficiency as projects scale.

Class A and B (Critical Operational Systems) projects
are implemented according to the standards and practices
used for the SSL Geosynchronous standard, with little
customization. This leverages an inventory of flightproven, high reliability components that are in
continuous manufacture. Hardware capability brackets
that required for most earth orbits and many deep space
missions. Class B is relatively similar to Class A, with
minor relaxations such as Grade 2 parts in place of Grade
1, as defined in Ref.2.
Class C (Moderately Critical Operational Systems)
projects are customized based on customer needs. Often,
increased performance requirements dictate the use of
modern components and devices available on the
commercial markets that must be evaluated and adapted
for use in space. This increased risk pays off in the form
of capabilities that exceed those of a traditional Class A
or B project without the years spent bringing
technologies to the traditional space levels.

An example is “Highly Accelerated Life Test” (HALT)
testing, which defines real capabilities and margins for
equipment. After establishment of good design margins,
subsequent testing can be scaled back to performance
and workmanship verification and, with sufficient data,
to functionality. HALT testing is expensive for GEO
equipment, but it is much less so for equipment of lower
cost.

Class D (Non-Critical Operational Systems) projects
take the opportunity of low-cost launch and manufacture
to demonstrate capabilities or perform experiments that
are important, but are of shorter term and are not critical
to the business or security of the customer. We have seen
such programs be multiply sourced as a method of riskreduction, with vendors competing to provide their own
variations of short-schedule demonstration missions.

We have factored modern manufacturing processes,
which we are also introducing into our GEO-Comm
model, into Smart Space projects as well. Some key
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Using this framework, SSL is producing its own Mission
Assurance requirements for LEO - small sat missions
incorporating our lessons learned incorporating the
highest value-added activities to optimize the likelihood
of mission success, regardless of whether a program is
Class A/B or Class C/D.

production. One example is Advanced Product Quality
Planning (APQP), which was developed by the
automotive industry to achieve their goal of zero defects
by focusing on quality early in the design process. The
aerospace industry has tailored APQP (see AS9145) to
achieve the goal of 100% mission success. The APQP
approach has not only improved quality but also has
driven down production costs in the automotive industry
and if implemented correctly should do the same for
aerospace.

The mission risk class helps establish the
implementation risk baseline and a mitigation strategy
by addressing:
• Test Philosophy: Design and Workmanship Validation
• Hardware Management: Unit/Part
Qualification, and Test/Screening Levels

PERFORMANCE VERIFICATION – DID WE
BUILD THE RIGHT THING?

Quality,

Every system design begins with understanding the
customer requirements and their mission goals. Once all
of the mission parameters are clearly defined, the
program’s risk mitigation strategy is created according
to risk tolerance. This provides SSL and its customers
with a clear picture of the risks. The risks are managed
to a plan specifying how and when they will be retired,
within the program schedule and cost targets.

• Supplier Management: Supplier Evaluation, Selection,
and Monitoring
• Configuration Management: Part, Unit Traceability and
Reporting
• Document Management: Documentation Levels,
Documentation and Data Deliverables

The performance and environmental requirements may
be verified on a proto-qualification spacecraft. The test
campaign serves to demonstrate that all design
parameters have been met and that the spacecraft design
is suitable for its intended mission. For constellations,
the proto-qualification spacecraft serves as the first
article used to certify the manufacturing processes.

• Customer Involvement Matrix: NCR and Engineering
Change Reporting, Management, and Approval Levels
The value of the risk classification framework is that it
provides a common language that enables
communication of the risk associated with a given
program from a very early proposal stage. It promotes
conversation with our customers regarding the risk
posture of a proposal and provides a clearer picture of
which risks are assumed, managed, and of the strategies
to mitigate them. On the execution side, establishing a
common understanding of what is allowed on the various
mission types in terms of process, parts, and procedures
is of significant importance.

RELIABILITY ANALYSIS– WILL IT PERFORM
OVER TIME?
Reliability analysis ensures reliable performance of the
spacecraft or constellation of spacecraft over the
required mission life. Traditional methods assess
reliability at the individual satellite level, but in
constellations SSL has furthermore adapted its approach
to consider the constellation as a whole when assessing
the ability to meet performance requirements. The
design guidelines for each mission are derived through
quantitative reliability assessments encompassing
constellation and spacecraft level evaluations of
redundancy, cross-strapping, and single-thread items.
This approach has enabled us to simplify system
architectures without introducing unacceptable risks by
deploying redundancy approaches that take the entire
constellation into account.

PRODUCT ASSURANCE BEGINS DURING THE
DESIGN PHASE
Small, agile, empowered co-located teams representing
all subsystems and phases of manufacturing are critical
to the design phase of the program. These teams ensure
that each design trade is evaluated not just for
performance, but as part of the overall system which
includes source of supply evaluations, manufacturing
constraints, and test approach. Mockups and additive
manufacturing are routinely used to aid in
manufacturability assessments throughout the design
phase. This approach reduces costly design iteration and
simplifies manufacturing operations.

FUNCTIONAL VERIFICATION – DID WE BUILD
IT RIGHT?
Test programs are tailored based on mission risk
classification which leverage data compiled from SSL’s
extensive flight history. We determine the highest
activities using a data driven approach that is

Additionally, SSL is investigating concepts from high
volume production settings for use in Small Satellite
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commensurate with the defined risk tolerance. All
critical parameters are tested to demonstrate proper
integration of the system on the proto-qualification
vehicle with a subset of those tested on each follow-on
satellite. Testing is further streamlined once the
manufacturing processes are deemed stable and
repeatable. This approach is applied to lower levels of
integration as well. Our goal is to ensure that risk is
retired as early as possible. SSL is streamlining testing
between levels of integration so that all tests are
performed at the point in the manufacturing cycle where
they provide the maximum benefit.
QUALITY
ASSURANCE
CRITICAL TASKS

FOCUSED

ON
Figure 3. NCR Priority and Severity Risk
Evaluation Criteria

Each task or operation is evaluated by level of criticality
from routine tasks, work order/phase completion, to
critical operations to ensure the proper level of oversight
is provided throughout the design and manufacturing
process. SSL’s quality strategy divides this activity into
two levels within the quality function:

NCR data are regularly reported to ensure the maximum
level of transparency to our customers. All NCRs are
prioritized based on the overall risk as described above
and dispositioned in accordance with the mission risk
classification of the program. All dispositions require a
minimum of two signatures and typically include the
subject matter expert and a representative from quality
assurance. Closure of NCRs are also defined according
to the mission risk classification and are reviewed with
the customer when there is a system level out of
specification or test anomaly that has a direct impact on
contractually specified performance parameters prior to
the closure of a major NCR.

1)
Quality Engineering is accountable for all
aspects of Quality, they define the quality requirements
that are to be followed by all levels of the organization.
These requirements such as critical operations,
inspection plans, non-conformance disposition and
correction, change control, improvement activities and
metric monitoring and analysis are all tailored to ensure
requirements are achieved and risk tolerance is met.

MATERIALS REVIEW BOARD PROCESSES
THAT SUPPORT VOLUME PRODUCTION

2)
Quality Control is responsible to ensure the
requirements as defined by Quality Engineering are
executed and met during the entire production cycle.
They provide signature authority to close out a
manufacturing stage and verify all work required for that
stage has been performed correctly before moving on to
the next phase.
NON-CONFORMANCE REPORTING
PRIORITIZED BASED ON RISK

The incorporation of the CAPA process aligns well with
constellation manufacturing which allows for all items
exhibiting anomalous behavior during satellite
integration activities to be removed from the
manufacturing line and replaced with the next unit in the
production run. The unit displaying anomalous behavior
is placed in a station where further investigation of the
item is performed off-line with minimal interruption to
the spacecraft build and to the factory. All corrective
actions implemented are evaluated against established
process controls to ensure accurate metrics are
maintained and any negative trends are quickly
identified to ensure that the appropriate corrective and
preventative actions are properly implemented.

(NCR)

The SSL Non-Conformance Reporting (NCR) System
follows an industry accepted CAPA (Corrective Action /
Preventive Action) system, whereby problems are
categorized and prioritized based on overall risk. The
risk is determined by assessing the probability of reoccurrence and severity. This includes an analysis of the
impact on cost and schedule, the ability to detect the
issue, and impact to mission should the risk be realized
(see Figure 3). This allows for management to focus
resources on the issues with the highest risk so that they
can more effectively determine root cause and corrective
/ preventive action. Lower risk problems require direct
causes to be corrected and contained.

PARTS – WHAT DO WE BUILD IT WITH?
Level 1 parts are still the standard, but level 2 are
becoming more common at both SSL and in its supply
chain. Part levels are defined in Ref. 2. COTS parts are
still being evaluated, but thus far have only been used on
mission risk class A and B programs when no class 1 or
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2 part exists and only after extensive screening to
establish level 1 equivalency. On mission risk class C
and D missions, COTS parts are procured in bulk and
whenever possible from a single date lot code. This
approach reduces the amount of lot level testing and
screening and improves part traceability.

Single Event Effects (SEE) need to be considered.
Modern electronic part types, both digital and analog,
may be sensitive to Single Event Upset (SEU), Multiple
Bit Upsets (MBU), Single Event Functional Interrupts
(SEFI), Single Event Burnout (SEB), Single Event Gate
Rupture (SEGR), Single Event Dielectric Rupture
(SEDR), and Single Event Latch-Up (SEL). Use of part
types or circuits susceptible to these effects can interrupt
a mission, or end it prematurely, unless there is an
internal unit self-detection and correction of the failures
caused by the occurrence of these effects. The rates or
likelihood of the effects can be determined from single
event effects testing. From test results (cross-section of
interaction) that are representative of the application, and
a knowledge of the environment, an upset rate, or failure
rate, is estimated. It is an exercise for the mission
planner, based on risk profile, to accept the risk or add
mitigation where critical.

RADIATION
Traditionally SSL has designed to radiation models AE8
(electrons) and AP8 (proton) models with 20% margin.
Newer programs are performing evaluations to the latest
version of the trapped radiation environment for protons
and electrons, which are given by models AE9 and AP9
for electrons and protons, respectively. These newer
models provide selectable levels of confidence (e.g.
90%), which is not an option in the older models.
In general, certain electronic parts (or materials) may
exceed parametric limits or fail to function at all after
exposure to a total ionizing dose (TID) of radiation. The
radiation comes from protons and electrons trapped in
the earth's radiation belts, as well as solar flares. The
exposure of any part depends on the spacecraft orbit and
mission duration, the solar cycle, spacecraft structure
and the parts package. For parts that exhibit parametric
drift that exceeds the parametric limits, the post radiation
drift values are statistically evaluated to determine if they
exceed the end-of-life (EOL) worst case design limits of
the circuit in which they are used. Data obtained from
SSL evaluation tests, data obtained from tests performed
by parts manufacturers or published literature are all
used for radiation acceptability evaluations. Some parts
may be susceptible to low dose rate effects, and these are
tested at low dose rate radiation levels.

CONCLUSIONS
Compared to our experience in GEO-Comm space
projects, we are early in our Smart Space learning
process. Still we have learned, or re-learned, several
important concepts.
First, Smart Space for a company like ours need not be
an effort in isolation. We have expertise and capabilities
within our infrastructure to draw upon that we can take
advantage of, even from a walled-off project, and it is a
mistake not to do so.
We have learned that we cannot just abandon our
established processes to implement modern production.
We implemented a scaled-down version of our GEOComm nonconformance workflow system on small sat
projects. We have learned that structure and planning is
important for even the smallest and quickest of projects.

Parts that do not meet the minimum TID are reviewed
for use in each application circuit. For low cost missions
using COTS hardware, radiation testing may be
performed on sacrificial circuit cards or units, rather than
at part level. Acceptability depends on a determination
of whether or not the shielding provided by the
spacecraft structure is sufficient to limit the accumulated
dose at end-of-life to a level less than that required to
cause circuit malfunction. If the shielding provided by
the spacecraft structure is not sufficient, then additional
shielding necessary to meet the end of life requirement
is added. If shielding cannot provide adequate
protection, then use of a radiation sensitive part may
limit the mission life. These determinations require
knowledge of the total accumulated dose and the worst
case parametric design requirements for the circuits
using the parts.

We rediscovered that supplier selection requires
diligence. The lowest price supplier is not always the
lowest cost path. The financial state of each supplier is
as key a variable as is the heritage of their product, its
performance and price. Continuity of expertise is more
important at small-scale suppliers than at larger
companies that have detailed documentation and larger
numbers of experienced staff.
Equipment that is newly designed needs extra up-front
attention. Production planning in-house and at suppliers
should start early. Schedules, parts procurement, test
equipment, facilities should be considered prior to
contract award.
Software development has proven challenging. This is
especially so when interaction is required between

Single event effects have various sources, namely
Galactic Cosmic Rays, trapped protons and solar flare
protons. In selecting a part for use in space, all of the
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software components. Early discussion and agreement
on interfaces and requirements is essential.
Mission Assurance should be involved during program
development and implementation. Waiting for
traditional gates is not a good practice when performing
non-traditional development. This applies to customer
oversight and involvement as well. Teamwork is the best
approach to achieve a common goal.
Appropriate tradeoffs between adaptability and
standardization; cost and certainty; performance and
heritage determine the effectiveness of each program and
of each product.
We need to be smart about “Smart Space”, and we are
learning much along the way.
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